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Investigative alerts: smart policy
or a way to skirt warrants?

C

hicago’s little-understood “investigative
alert” system has
been in the news a lot
in the past year.
It was denounced by an appellate court judge as an “end run”
around the Constitution and criticized in a news story as a way to
“sidestep” civil liberties protections. “Critics: Police Sidestep
Warrants,” Chicago Tribune
(March 4, 2013). But what exactly
are investigative alerts? Are they
constitutional? And if so, are they
smart policy?
The type of investigative alert
we’re talking about is a searchable
entry in a database which tells
police officers that there’s probable cause to believe a suspect has
committed a crime and that the
suspect should be arrested if
found.
If an officer comes upon an individual for whom an investigative
alert is outstanding, the officer
will arrest him even if he has no
first-hand knowledge of the suspect’s criminal conduct and even
if there is no outstanding warrant
for his arrest. Prior to 2001, investigative alerts were called
“stop orders.”
On its face, the investigative
alert system looks constitutionally suspect. The Fourth Amendment presumes that arrests will
be made with a valid arrest warrant.
As the Supreme Court explained in Wong Sun v. United
States (1963), the warrant procedure ensures that “the deliberate,
impartial judgment of the judicial
officer will be interposed between
the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of
the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause.”
With the investigative alert
system, even though there may
be time to procure a warrant,
the police instead make arrests
without seeking judicial preapproval.
It’s for this reason that a 1st
District justice wrote last year
that the Chicago Police Department had “institutionalized an

end run around the warrant requirement in the Constitution.”
People v. Hyland, 981 N.E. 414, 427
(Ill. App. 2012) (Salone, J., concurring).
There is nonetheless every reason to accept that investigative
alerts are, indeed, constitutional.
Notwithstanding the presence of
the warrants clause in the Fourth
Amendment, the touchstone of
constitutionality for a search or
seizure is not whether the police
have secured a warrant but instead whether or not they have
acted “reasonably.”
Authority for government
agents to make warrantless arrests for felonies committed in
their presence has deep roots in
English common law.
We rightly accept that an officer who witnesses a serious
crime committed in front of him
is authorized to make an immediate arrest without first checking in with a judge. And with the
advent of large, modern police
forces, the courts have extended
this authority — through the “fellow officer” rule — to an officer
who reasonably relies on the
firsthand observations of other
officers.
The investigative alert system
is just an elaboration of the “fellow officer” rule. So long as the
information used to trigger an investigative alert is adequate to
establish probable cause to arrest
a suspect, an officer who relies on
the investigative alert is acting
reasonably and in accord with the
Fourth Amendment. It’s unsurprising, therefore, that there have
been no successful constitutional
challenges to the system — or to
similar systems in cities like New
York or Los Angeles.
That said, there are many reasons why the system might be
unwise as a matter of policy.
First, arrests made pursuant to
an investigative alert instead of
an arrest warrant are subject to
more penetrating judicial review
when later challenged in the context of a motion to suppress evidence gathered as a result of the
arrest.
The Supreme Court has noted
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that “the resolution of doubtful or
marginal cases [of probable
cause] … should be largely determined by the preference to be
accorded to warrants.” United
States v. Ventresca (1965). That
means the prosecution loses at
least a marginal advantage at a
suppression hearing if officers relied on their own department’s
probable cause determination, instead of first clearing the arrest
with a judicial officer.
Second, if police are too easily
allowed to skirt the warrant requirement — which requires a
neutral judge to assess whether
probable cause exists — there is
every reason to expect they will
misuse their arresting power.
Officers told the Chicago Tribune in March, for example, that
investigative alerts allowed them

‘‘

With the
investigative
alert system, even
though there may
be time to procure
a warrant, the
police instead
make arrests
without seeking
judicial
preapproval. ”

to arrest suspects for whom they
believe there is not enough evidence for prosecutors to file
charges, but whom they are eager
to question.
“Realistically, when we have
these cases, we have very little,
next to nothing,” a former homicide officer told the newspaper. If
this officer is suggesting that investigative alerts authorize arrests where the evidence falls
short of the probable cause required to be charged with a
crime, then he is incorrect. And it
is disturbing to think that an officer might conclude that the
standard for arresting someone
via an investigative alert is lower
than that required for proceeding
by warrant.
A third reason for questioning
the wisdom of investigative alerts
is that the system leaves Chicago
exposed to damages claims for
false arrest.
The Chicago Tribune discussed
the case of a citizen who was
arrested by officers who relied on
an investigative alert indicating
that the man had committed an
armed robbery. It’s likely that the
reason the officers did not approach a judge first is because
they knew they had too little evidence for an arrest warrant. After the defendant was acquitted
at trial, he sued the city for false
arrest — and won a settlement of
$570,000.
Finally, by refusing to seek arrest warrants, Chicago police lose
the ability to exploit state and
federal databases that are designed to alert an officer whenever a person in his custody is a
felon fleeing from another jurisdiction. Generally speaking, these
databases will not accept information about suspects where no
arrest warrant was first procured
by police.
In sum, the constitutionality of
the investigative alert system is
beyond dispute, notwithstanding
the understandable dismay about
the system expressed by the concurring justices in Hyland. But
there are some very good
reasons for all of us to rethink its
value.
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